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Remedial Minimalism under  
Section 24(1) of the Charter: 
Bjelland, Khadr and Nasogaluak 
Gerald Chan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Grant1 has domi-
nated the attention of criminal and constitutional law enthusiasts this 
year. This is easily justifiable. The new framework set out by the Su-
preme Court for the remedy of exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 will have a significant 
and immediate effect on the way that criminal trials are conducted in 
Canada. Hidden beneath this very visible jurisprudential shift, however, 
is a more subtle, though no less significant, revision of the Court’s ap-
proach to the Charter’s other remedial provision: section 24(1). In three 
decisions from the past year — R. v. Bjelland,3 Canada (Prime Minister) 
v. Khadr4 and R. v. Nasogaluak5 — the Supreme Court of Canada has 
agreed with the trial judge’s finding of a breach of Charter rights but 
overturned the trial judge’s choice of remedy under section 24(1) in or-
der to grant a more limited remedy in its place. In doing so, the Court has 
retreated from the broad and generous manner in which it previously ap-
plied section 24(1) and shifted the analytical focus from the promotion of 
remedial efficacy toward the minimization of the burdens imposed by the 
remedy on government. 
                                                                                                             
*
 Ruby & Shiller, Toronto. I extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Jamie Cameron for 
her very helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. I also extend my thanks to Clayton C. 
Ruby for his constant support and to Yousuf Aftab and Nader R. Hasan for their thoughtful com-
ments and suggestions throughout this drafting process. 
1
 [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]. 
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 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3
 [2009] S.C.J. No. 38, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 651 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bjelland”]. 
4
 [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, 2010 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khadr”]. 
5
 [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, 2010 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nasogaluak”]. I should note that I 
was co-counsel for the Criminal Lawyers’ Association on their intervention in the Supreme Court of 
Canada in this case. 
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In Bjelland, for example, the trial judge found a violation of the ac-
cused’s right to full answer and defence due to the Crown’s disclosure of 
evidence on the eve of trial and ordered the evidence excluded. The Su-
preme Court of Canada overturned the trial judge’s decision on remedy 
and held that an adjournment would suffice to remedy the breach. In do-
ing so, the Court imposed a new test for the remedy of exclusion under 
section 24(1) that narrows the availability of the remedy to circumstances 
similar to those required for a stay of proceedings.6  
In Khadr, the applications judge held that Canadian officials had vio-
lated Mr. Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights by failing to protect him given 
that he was a minor, was subject to torture, was unable to legally chal-
lenge his detention or conditions of confinement, and was being detained 
with no family contact. The applications judge ordered that the Canadian 
government remedy this breach by requesting Mr. Khadr’s repatriation 
from the United States.7 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that there 
had been a section 7 Charter breach (although it characterized the breach 
differently) but held that a request for repatriation was inappropriate as a 
remedy because of the uncertain foreign policy implications, notwith-
standing that a more intrusive remedy with respect to foreign relations 
had been granted in the earlier case of United States of America v. 
Burns.8 The Court granted a bare declaration in place of the request for 
repatriation ordered by the applications judge. 
Finally, in Nasogaluak, the trial judge found that the arresting offi-
cers had violated the accused’s section 7 Charter rights by using 
excessive force in his arrest for impaired driving. The trial judge refused 
to grant the requested remedy of a stay of proceedings, but chose instead 
to reduce the accused’s sentence to a conditional discharge, which fell 
below the statutorily mandated minimum of a $600 fine. The Supreme 
Court of Canada agreed that the police had used excessive force in arrest-
ing the accused, but held that the remedy of a sentence reduction under 
section 24(1) had to be constrained by the mandatory minimum sen-
tences imposed by Parliament in all but “exceptional circumstances”. 
The Court did not define “exceptional circumstances” but simply held 
that they did not exist in this case.  
The common theme in each of these three judgments is the shifting 
of emphasis away from the efficacy of the Charter remedy toward a 
                                                                                                             
6
 R. v. Bjelland, supra, note 3, at paras. 10-12. 
7
 Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 2009 FC 405, at paras. 70, 75, 
91-92 (F.C.). 
8
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Burns”]. 
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minimization of the burdens imposed on government. From a rights-
protection perspective, this trend is worrisome. A Charter claimant bears 
the onus of establishing a breach of his or her constitutional rights. Once 
he or she has done so, it remains open to the government to demonstrate 
that the breach is a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society  
under section 1 of the Charter, at which stage the courts ought quite 
properly to consider the broader societal interests pursued by the gov-
ernment. However, once one has moved past this stage and the Court has 
concluded that the Charter breach cannot be justified, a compelling ar-
gument can be made that the section 24(1) analysis should focus 
primarily on remedial efficacy. The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent 
cases signal a move away from such an approach.  
II. SECTION 24(1) OF THE CHARTER 
The Supreme Court of Canada has historically described section 
24(1) of the Charter in broad-sweeping terms. For instance, in R. v. 
974649 Ontario Inc., McLachlin C.J.C. wrote that section 24(1) is the 
“cornerstone upon which the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Charter are founded” and a “critical means by which they are realized 
and preserved”.9 This effusive language can be attributed to two aspects 
of the provision: the breadth of the discretion it confers and the signifi-
cance of its purpose. 
Section 24(1) of the Charter provides: 
 24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of 
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances. (emphasis added) 
As McIntyre J. wrote in R. v. Mills, it is “difficult to imagine lan-
guage which could give the court a wider and less fettered discretion”.10 
As a result, this discretion cannot be reduced “to some sort of binding 
formula for general application in all cases” and “it is not for appellate 
courts to pre-empt or cut down this wide discretion”.11  
It is instructive to compare section 24(1) to the other remedial provi-
sions in the Constitution. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
                                                                                                             
9
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575, at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “974649 On-
tario Inc.”]. 
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 [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at para. 279 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]. 
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provides that “(t)he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Can-
ada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect”. 
Therefore, section 52(1) is aimed specifically at unconstitutional laws as 
opposed to unconstitutional acts, and it delineates fairly clear boundaries 
of application.12 If a law is inconsistent with any provision of the Consti-
tution, that law is invalid. The courts have introduced some flexibility at 
the borders by providing for the remedies of reading in and severance in 
addition to declarations of invalidity, but the overall exercise remains 
fairly clear: determine the extent of the law’s inconsistency with the 
Constitution and then decide how much of the law can be saved.13  
Section 24 of the Charter, on the other hand, is aimed at government 
acts. Section 24(2), for instance, provides that where “evidence was ob-
tained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is estab-
lished that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in 
the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”. 
This provision is aimed at a very specific subset of constitutional viola-
tions (i.e., those occurring in the context of gathering evidence) and 
provides a very specific remedy (i.e., the exclusion of evidence). Again, 
it delineates fairly clear boundaries of application. 
In contrast to both section 52(1) and section 24(2), section 24(1) of 
the Charter does not identify a specific type or category of remedies. In-
stead, it simply provides that a court may award “such remedy as the 
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”. This broad 
language has made section 24(1) the provision of choice for a wide array 
of remedies for Charter breaches, including stays of proceeding,14 injunc-
tions,15 return of evidence,16 costs17 and damages.18 Freed of the 
constraints imposed by the text of sections 52(1) and 24(2), the courts 
have taken advantage of the breadth of discretion conferred by section 
24(1) to craft creative and meaningful remedies for the vindication of 
Charter rights.  
                                                                                                             
12
 R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at paras. 59-60 (S.C.C.). 
13
 Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at paras. 25-42 (S.C.C.). 
14
 Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2008), 
at 9.50 [hereinafter “Roach, Constitutional Remedies”]. 
15
 Id., at 13.370. 
16
 Id., at 9.700. 
17
 Id., at 11.810. 
18
 Id., at 11.480. 
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The courts have justified adopting a flexible and expansive approach 
to section 24(1) by reference to the significance of its purpose. As 
McLachlin C.J.C. wrote in 974649 Ontario Inc., “a right, no matter how 
expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its 
breach”.19 A remedy must, therefore, be “easily available and constitu-
tional rights should not be ‘smothered in procedural delays and 
difficulties’”.20 Remedial provisions have always been granted “large and 
liberal” interpretations when they are found in statutes; a fortiori, they 
ought to be interpreted broadly when they are found in the Constitution.21 
In other words, a remedial analysis must remain flexible if it is to be re-
sponsive to the needs and interests of Charter claimants and such 
flexibility ought to be curtailed only where specifically mandated by the 
text of the Constitution. 
This was not merely rhetoric. Perhaps the most telling example of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s generous interpretation of the Charter’s 
broad remedial guarantee is its decision in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova 
Scotia (Minister of Education).22 In that case, section 24(1) was applied 
to remedy a breach of the appellants’ minority language rights under sec-
tion 23 of the Charter. A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the trial 
judge’s decision to not only order the Province of Nova Scotia to use its 
“best efforts” to provide school facilities, but to also retain jurisdiction 
after the order to hear reports from the Province regarding the status of 
its efforts. Writing for the majority, Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. were unde-
terred by the dissenting justices’ arguments that such an order extended 
the Court’s jurisdiction beyond its proper role in breach of the separation 
of powers principle and in violation of the functus officio doctrine. In-
stead, the majority emphasized the need for flexibility and creativity in 
the application of section 24(1) so as to ensure that Charter rights are 
meaningfully and fully vindicated: 
… it must be remembered that s. 24 is part of a constitutional scheme 
for the vindication of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
Charter. As such, s. 24, because of its broad language and the myriad 
of roles it may play in cases, should be allowed to evolve to meet the 
challenges and circumstances of those cases. That evolution may 
require novel and creative features when compared to traditional and 
historical remedial practice because tradition and history cannot be 
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 Supra, note 9, at para. 20. 
20
 Id., at para. 20. 
21
 Id., at para. 18. 
22
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”]. 
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barriers to what reasoned and compelling notions of appropriate and 
just remedies demand. In short, the judicial approach to remedies must 
remain flexible and responsible to the needs of a given case.23  
Neither the rhetoric nor the reasoning of cases such as Doucet-
Boudreau or 974649 Ontario Inc. was anywhere to be found, however, in 
the Court’s recent decisions in Bjelland, Khadr and Nasogaluak. Instead, 
the Court appeared to rebalance its priorities under section 24(1) such 
that the minimization of burdens imposed by the remedy on government 
has now attained greater importance in the remedial calculus than the 
creation of an effective and meaningful remedy to fully vindicate Charter 
rights.  
III. R. V. BJELLAND — EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE  
VERSUS ADJOURNMENT 
In Bjelland, the appellant was arrested upon driving a motor vehicle 
across the border from the United States to Canada in December 2003 
and charged with importing cocaine and possession for the purposes of 
trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.24 Vari-
ous pre-hearing conferences subsequently took place and the Crown 
advised defence counsel that disclosure was substantially complete. The 
preliminary hearing was held over the course of three days in October 
2004 and January 2005, and the appellant was committed for trial on 
both counts. The appellant pleaded not guilty and elected trial by judge 
and jury. A trial date was set for May 1, 2006. 
On March 21, 2006, less than two months before the trial was sched-
uled to begin, the Crown advised defence counsel that disclosure of 
evidence concerning an alleged accomplice was forthcoming. On March 
24, 2006, the appellant re-elected for trial by judge alone. On March 29, 
2006, the Crown disclosed a transcript of a videotaped statement taken 
over a year before on December 16, 2004 from the alleged accomplice 
and indicated that he would be called as a witness at trial.  
On April 19, 2006, less than two weeks before the trial was sched-
uled to begin, the Crown advised the defence that it was aware of 
information concerning one of the officers who took the alleged accom-
plice’s statement that was potentially relevant to the officer’s credibility, 
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 Id., at para. 59. 
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 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
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character and ability to perform his duties during his involvement in the 
investigation, and invited the appellant to bring a third party records ap-
plication for access to this information. On the same day, the Crown 
disclosed to the defendant a five-page agreed statement of facts from an-
other proceeding (i.e., a guilty plea and sentencing hearing) signed by 
another alleged accomplice. The Crown advised that it intended to call 
this second alleged accomplice as a witness at trial as well. Further in-
formation was disclosed on April 22, 2006. 
The defence responded to the Crown’s ever-shifting case and last-
minute disclosures by bringing a motion for a stay of proceedings on the 
ground that the appellant’s right to make full answer and defence under 
section 7 of the Charter had been infringed. The appellant asked, in the 
alternative, that the evidence of the two alleged accomplices be excluded 
from the trial. 
The trial judge refused to grant a stay of proceedings but agreed to 
exclude the evidence. The trial judge described the situation as follows: 
“… on the eve of trial, counsel for the accused is left to speculate on 
what will be provided to him by way of final disclosure and how to 
mount a defence against an ever moving prosecution”.25 The trial judge 
rejected the Crown’s argument that the statement of one of the alleged 
accomplices could not have been disclosed earlier because of concerns 
about his safety and because he was being investigated by U.S. authori-
ties. In doing so, the trial judge noted that the alleged accomplice was not 
in a witness protection program and had not sought security assistance, 
and that his statement had actually been released in British Columbia 
several weeks earlier.26 The agreed statement of facts concerning the 
other alleged accomplice was not disclosed earlier due to Crown inadver-
tence.27 
In the trial judge’s view, the process to which the accused was sub-
jected was unfair and the proper remedy was exclusion of the late-
disclosed evidence because it would “place both the accused and the 
Crown in the position they occupied before the Crown attempted to  
introduce this new evidence”. An adjournment of the trial date would be 
insufficient because it would amount to “nothing more than a reward for 
the Crown’s tardiness”.28 
                                                                                                             
25
 Bjelland, supra, note 3, at para. 10. 
26
 R. v. Bjelland, [2007] A.J. No. 1445, 2007 ABCA 425, at paras. 12, 18 (Alta. C.A.). 
27
 Id., at para. 18. 
28
 Bjelland, supra, note 3, at paras. 11-12. 
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In a 2-1 decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal disagreed. The major-
ity of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed a 
reviewable error by failing to consider whether a less severe remedy than 
the exclusion of significant evidence could cure the harm done to the 
respondent by the late disclosure, while still preserving the integrity of 
the justice system. The majority stated that the trial judge overempha-
sized the respondent’s rights while giving inadequate weight to society’s 
interest in crime prevention.29 Justice Booker dissented and, in doing so, 
cited the warning that the Supreme Court of Canada first gave in Mills: 
appellate courts must exercise caution to ensure they do not “pre-empt or 
cut down” the wide discretion given by section 24(1) to the trial judge.30 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the majority 
of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge’s decision on remedy could not 
stand. In a judgment written by Rothstein J., and joined by McLachlin 
C.J.C. and LeBel and Deschamps JJ., the majority held that the trial 
judge erred by “failing to consider whether the prejudice to the appellant 
could be remedied without excluding the evidence and the resulting dis-
tortion of the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process”.31 In 
the majority’s view, the prejudice caused by the Crown’s late disclosure 
in this case could have been remedied through a simple adjournment and 
disclosure order. The more drastic remedy of exclusion of evidence under 
section 24(1) should only be available in one or two instances: (1) where 
the late disclosure renders the trial process unfair and this unfairness 
cannot be remedied through an adjournment and disclosure order; or (2) 
where exclusion is necessary to maintain the integrity of the justice sys-
tem.32 This second exceptional circumstance is itself limited to “clear 
cases”.33 Thus, even in cases where an adjournment would have the ef-
fect of unreasonably delaying the trial of an in-custody accused or where 
there is evidence of deliberate Crown misconduct, the courts must bal-
ance such circumstances against society’s interest in having all of the 
evidence presented at trial.34 Where a “less intrusive remedy” can be 
fashioned, exclusion of evidence will not be available.35 
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 R. v. Bjelland, supra, note 26, at para. 30. 
30
 Id., at para. 41. 
31
 Bjelland, supra, note 3, at para. 3. 
32
 Id., at para. 24. 
33




 Id., at para. 19. 
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This decision can be criticized on a number of bases, most of which 
were expressed by Fish J. in a scathing dissent written on behalf of Bin-
nie and Abella JJ.  
First, if the test adopted by the majority of the Supreme Court sounds 
familiar, that is because it is. It is strikingly similar to the test that the 
courts have long applied to the availability of the much more drastic 
remedy of a stay of proceedings, which of course was the remedy that the 
appellant originally asked for in this case and the trial judge refused. As 
L’Heureux-Dube J. wrote in the seminal case of R. v. O’Connor, a stay of 
proceedings will be available only in the “clearest of cases”: (1) where 
the prejudice to the accused’s right to make full answer and defence can-
not be remedied; or (2) where irreparable prejudice would be caused to 
the integrity of the judicial system if the prosecution were continued.36 
This is nearly identical to the test adopted by the majority in Bjelland for 
the remedy of exclusion of evidence under section 24(1), prompting Fish 
J. to point the following out in dissent: 
At best, this fusion of the formerly distinct tests invites confusion 
regarding their application to the two distinct remedies. At worst, the 
fused test eliminates exclusion of evidence as a live option under s. 
24(1).37 
If the latter is true, this would be an unfortunate development in the 
jurisprudence of section 24(1) of the Charter. The courts have properly 
characterized a stay of proceedings as a drastic remedy as it results in the 
absolute termination of the prosecution. Its severity lies in its finality. 
The alternative remedy of an adjournment, however, is often inadequate. 
Indeed, an adjournment may be the only Charter remedy that can actually 
increase prejudice to an accused by adding further delay to the proceed-
ings. This is the case regardless of whether an accused is in custody and 
regardless of whether the delay has reached the point of “unreasonable-
ness” within the meaning of section 11(b) of the Charter. Every day that 
an accused spends dealing with the “vexations and vicissitudes of a 
pending criminal prosecution” is a day filled with stigmatization, loss of 
privacy, and a tremendous amount of stress and anxiety.38 An adjourn-
ment simply lengthens this process and exacerbates the resulting 
hardship. 
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 R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 82 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “O’Connor”]. 
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 Bjelland, supra, note 3, at para. 45. 
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 Mills, supra, note 10, at para. 146. 
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Thus, the remedy of exclusion of evidence has been seen by academ-
ics39 and previous members of the Supreme Court40 as a useful 
intermediate option to remedy the late disclosure of evidence from the 
Crown in violation of an accused’s constitutional right under section 7 of 
the Charter. As the trial judge noted, it puts the parties in the position 
they were in before the Charter breach. The majority’s decision in Bjel-
land could well spell the end of this practical, common sense approach.  
Second, the majority’s decision in Bjelland ignores the Supreme 
Court’s previous holding that subsections 24(1) and (2) of the Charter 
should be read together to create a harmonious interpretation.41 As Fish J. 
noted in dissent, the test adopted by the majority regulates the discretion-
ary remedy of exclusion of evidence under section 24(1) more closely, 
and more intrusively, than the exact same remedy under section 24(2).42 
The Supreme Court held in Grant that the courts should decide whether 
to exclude evidence under section 24(2) by engaging in a balancing of 
the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact of the 
breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused, and society’s 
interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.43 Under the major-
ity’s decision in Bjelland, however, the courts would not engage in an 
even-handed balancing of factors; rather, they would place the burden on 
the accused to demonstrate that exclusion is the least intrusive remedy. 
They would engage in a sort of “minimal impairment” analysis in re-
verse.44  
One can see the incongruity of such an approach by comparing the 
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 Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra, note 14, at 9-20.12. 
40
 O’Connor, supra, note 36, at para. 66, in which L’Heureux-Dubé J. cited the trial judge’s 
exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) in R. v. Xenos, [1991] J.Q. no 2200, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 362 (Que. 
C.A.) as an “excellent example … of how courts are becoming increasingly bold and innovative in 
finding appropriate remedies in lieu of stays for abuses of process”. 
41
 974649 Ontario Inc., supra, note 9, at para. 21. 
42
 Bjelland, supra, note 3, at para. 47. 
43
 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 71. 
44
 Whereas s. 1 of the Charter requires the government to demonstrate that its conduct mini-
mally impairs an individual’s Charter rights, once the government has failed to do so and a Charter 
breach has therefore been found, the majority’s approach in Bjelland would effectively require the 
individual to demonstrate that the remedy he or she seeks minimally impairs the government’s inter-
ests under s. 24(1). 
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Section 24(1) Section 24(2) 
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, 
as guaranteed by this Charter, 
have been infringed or denied 
may apply to a court of competent 
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy 
as the court considers appropriate 
and just in the circumstances. 
 
Where, in proceedings under 
subsection (1), a court concludes 
that evidence was obtained in a 
manner that infringed or denied 
any rights or freedoms guaran-
teed by this Charter, the evidence 
shall be excluded if it is estab-
lished that, having regard to all 
the circumstances, the admission 
of it in the proceedings would 
bring the administration of jus-
tice into disrepute. 
 
 
Not only is the language in section 24(1) considerably broader than 
the language in section 24(2), but the former appears to focus solely on 
the impact of the remedy on the individual Charter claimant, whereas the 
latter expressly requires that the “administration of justice be brought 
into disrepute” before the remedy of exclusion will be granted. As the 
Supreme Court held in Grant, the difference between the two provisions 
is, therefore, that the first provides for an “individual remedy”, whereas 
the second focuses on the “societal interest in maintaining public confi-
dence in the administration of justice”.45 Given this distinction, it is 
puzzling that the majority in Bjelland placed a greater emphasis on the 
societal interest in having all of the relevant evidence before the trier of 
fact in applying section 24(1) than did the unanimous Court in Grant in 
applying section 24(2). Even as the Court discussed this societal interest 
in Grant, the Court was careful to point out that the “short-term public 
clamour for a conviction in a particular case must not deafen the section 
24(2) judge to the longer-term repute of the administration of justice”.46 
The majority’s judgment in Bjelland contains no similar refrain for the 
section 24(1) judge. Instead, it was left up to Fish J. in dissent to quote 
(then Chief Justice of Manitoba) Samuel Freedman’s well-known state-
ment of the law: 
The objective of a criminal trial is justice. Is the quest of justice 
synonymous with the search for truth? In most cases, yes. Truth and 
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 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 201. 
46
 Id., at para. 84. 
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justice will emerge in a happy coincidence. But not always. Nor should 
it be thought that the judicial process has necessarily failed if justice 
and truth do not end up in perfect harmony … . [T]he law makes its 
choice between competing values and declares it is better to close the 
case without all the available evidence being put on the record. We 
place a ceiling price on truth. It is glorious to possess, but not at 
unlimited cost. “Truth, like all good things, may be loved unwisely — 
may be pursued too keenly — may cost too much.”47 
Third, the majority’s judgment ignores perhaps the single most re-
peated and discernible principle in the Supreme Court’s previous section 
24(1) cases: appellate courts should defer to the trial judge’s exercise of 
remedial discretion. Section 24(1) confers the “widest possible discre-
tion”48 on trial judges and reviewing courts must therefore show 
“considerable deference”49 to the remedial choices of the trial judge. The 
majority in Bjelland did not exhibit any such restraint, although it is per-
haps unfair to criticize it too harshly on this independent basis because its 
decision to interfere with the trial judge’s exercise of discretion is a direct 
consequence of its decision to delineate new parameters for the exercise 
of that discretion. As Fish J. wrote in dissent, “the trial judge’s exercise 
of discretion … can properly be characterized as an error of law only if 
we change the law”.50 That is precisely what the majority did in this case. 
IV. CANADA (PRIME MINISTER) V. KHADR — REQUEST FOR  
REPATRIATION VERSUS DECLARATION 
The Supreme Court of Canada continued its more restrictive ap-
proach to section 24(1) of the Charter in Khadr. The facts of this case are 
now well known. Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, was 15 years old 
when he was taken prisoner on July 27, 2002 by U.S. forces in Afghani-
stan. He was accused of throwing a grenade that killed an American 
soldier in battle. Approximately three months after his capture, he was 
transferred to Guantánamo Bay, where he was given no special status as 
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a minor and was held incommunicado until November 2004. Mr. Khadr 
was declared an “enemy combatant” and was charged with war crimes.51  
In February and September 2003, while Mr. Khadr was still being 
detained without access to counsel, agents from the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) and the Foreign Intelligence Division of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (“DFAIT”) 
went to Guantánamo Bay, questioned Mr. Khadr on matters connected to 
his charges and shared the fruits of these interviews with U.S. authorities. 
In March 2004, a DFAIT official attended Guantánamo Bay to interview 
Mr. Khadr again, this time with the knowledge that he had been sub-
jected by U.S. authorities to a sleep deprivation technique known as the 
“frequent flyer program”, which involved moving Mr. Khadr to a new 
location every three hours over a period of several weeks. The purpose of 
this torture was to make Mr. Khadr less resistant to interrogation. All of 
the interrogations conducted by the Canadian officials were conducted 
for intelligence and not evidence-gathering purposes. Nonetheless, they 
shared the fruits of the interrogations with U.S. officials and made no 
request that the U.S. officials limit their use of the information.52 
In 2006, Mr. Khadr brought an application for disclosure of all mate-
rials in the possession of the Canadian government relevant to his 
charges and the case ended up before the Supreme Court of Canada.53 In 
deciding that the Charter applied to require disclosure of some of the  
requested materials, the Court held that the regime under which Mr. 
Khadr was being detained in Guantánamo Bay (and in which the Cana-
dian government had participated) violated international human rights 
norms. In particular, the Court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Rasul v. Bush54 that detainees were being held without access to 
the statutory right of habeas corpus and in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld55 that the 
military commission procedures under which detainees were proposed to 
be tried violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered disclosure under section 7 of 
the Charter.56 
Armed with newfound information — namely, that Mr. Khadr had 
been subjected to the “frequent flyer program” — Mr. Khadr’s lawyers 
filed an application in Federal Court seeking to compel the Canadian 
government to request his repatriation from the U.S., which it had re-
peatedly refused to do. Justice O’Reilly granted this application. He 
concluded that, in the unique circumstances of this case, taking into ac-
count that Mr. Khadr was a minor, was subject to torture, was unable to 
legally challenge his detention or conditions of confinement, and was 
being detained with no family contact, section 7 of the Charter obliged 
the Canadian government to protect Mr. Khadr by ensuring that his 
treatment accorded with international human rights norms.57 Justice 
O’Reilly thus ordered the Canadian government to request Mr. Khadr’s 
repatriation under section 7 of the Charter. Justice O’Reilly did not feel 
compelled to undertake a separate section 24(1) analysis.58 
A majority of the Federal Court of Appeal upheld O’Reilly J.’s deci-
sion, albeit on a narrower basis. The majority found a section 7 Charter 
breach but did not characterize it as the failure to fulfil a positive obliga-
tion. Rather, the majority grounded the breach on the Canadian officials’ 
knowing participation in a process that violated international human 
rights norms. In particular, the majority stressed that the Canadian gov-
ernment became implicated in the torture of Mr. Khadr when they 
interrogated him knowing that he had been subjected to sleep deprivation 
in order to induce him to talk.59 The majority upheld the remedy of order-
ing the Canadian government to request Mr. Khadr’s repatriation but did 
so within the framework of section 24(1) of the Charter.60 
The matter went back up to the Supreme Court of Canada. In a 
unanimous decision, the Court agreed with both O’Reilly J. and the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal that the Canadian government had breached Mr. 
Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights and described the breach in the strongest 
of terms: 
… Canadian officials questioned Mr. Khadr on matters that may have 
provided important evidence relating to his criminal proceedings, in 
circumstances where they knew Mr. Khadr was being indefinitely 
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detained, was a young person and was alone during the interrogations. 
Further, the March 2004 interview, where Mr. Khadr refused to answer 
questions, was conducted knowing that Mr. Khadr had been subjected 
to three weeks of scheduled sleep deprivation, a measure described by 
the U.S. Military Commission in Jawad as designed to “make 
[detainees] more compliant and break down their resistance to 
interrogation” (para. 4). 
This conduct establishes Canadian participation in state conduct that 
violates the principles of fundamental justice. Interrogation of youth, to 
elicit statements about the most serious criminal charges while detained 
in those conditions and without access to counsel, and while knowing 
that the fruits of the interrogations would be shared with the U.S. 
prosecutors, offends the most basic Canadian standards about the 
treatment of detained youth suspects.61  
In addition, the Supreme Court characterized the breach of Mr. 
Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights as ongoing in two respects: (1) it has 
contributed and continues to contribute to Mr. Khadr’s current deten-
tion;62 and (2) the information obtained by Canadian officials in the 
interrogations may be used in the U.S. prosecution of Mr. Khadr.63 
Therefore, the effect of the breaches has not been spent. 
Given these findings, one would have hoped that the effectiveness of 
the remedy granted by the Court would have been commensurate with 
the severity of the Charter violations. This, however, was not the case. 
Rather than ordering the Canadian government to request Mr. Khadr’s 
repatriation as both O’Reilly J. and the Federal Court of Appeal had done 
in the courts below, the Supreme Court granted a bare declaration that 
Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights had been breached and left it for the govern-
ment to decide how best to respond.64 This is a disappointing decision for 
a number of reasons.  
First, not all declarations are created equal. The Supreme Court of 
Canada defended its choice of remedy by citing its previous statement in 
R. v. Gamble that a declaration can be “an effective and flexible remedy 
for the settlement of real disputes”.65 In Gamble, the appellant argued 
that he had been incorrectly tried and punished under the law in effect at 
the time of his trial and not the law in effect at the time of the offence. He 
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was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 
years for first degree murder; had he been sentenced under the law in 
effect at the time of the offence, he could have been eligible for parole 
after no more than 20 years but no less than 10 years. Accordingly, after 
10 years of imprisonment, the appellant brought an application for ha-
beas corpus and sought a declaration that he was eligible for parole as a 
remedy for the breach of his section 7 Charter right. The Court granted 
this declaration.  
The declaration granted in Gamble was a specific declaration that 
dictated a particular outcome with practical consequences. An equivalent 
remedy in Khadr would have been a declaration that Mr. Khadr was enti-
tled to a request for repatriation. But Mr. Khadr did not receive that. 
Instead, all Mr. Khadr received was a bald declaration that his Charter 
rights had been violated. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal re-
cently said, this type of declaration is “nothing more than a finding of 
fact” and “is not a remedy at all”.66 As a practical matter, Mr. Khadr was 
left in the same position after the Court’s declaration as he was in prior to 
launching his application in Federal Court. 
Second, even declarations of the nature that the Court granted in 
Gamble have been held to be inappropriate when there is evidence of 
government resistance to compliance with the Charter. In Doucet-
Boudreau, the Court justified the trial judge’s remedy of injunctive re-
lief on the basis that the law of section 23 of the Charter was now well 
settled and the government understood its obligations but had simply 
refused to comply with them.67 In such a case, the Court held that a 
mere declaration of rights would not provide an effective and meaning-
ful vindication of rights. The same is arguably true of Mr. Khadr’s case. 
When Mr. Khadr was first before the Supreme Court on his disclosure 
application, the Court had held that the Canadian government violated 
its international human rights obligations by interrogating him at 
Guantánamo Bay and sharing the fruits of that interrogation with U.S. 
officials.68 Moreover, as the Court itself said in its second decision, the 
rights that the Canadian government violated represented “the most 
basic Canadian standards” about the treatment of detained youth sus-
pects.69 This was not a case dealing with a novel interpretation or 
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application of a Charter right. Nonetheless, the government of Canada 
had repeatedly and consistently refused to seek Mr. Khadr’s repatria-
tion. This resistance should have militated in favour of a stronger 
remedy than a bare declaration.  
Third, this was not a case in which there were a myriad different 
ways in which the government could have responded to the Court’s rul-
ing to effectively remedy the Charter violation.70 The Court’s conclusion 
that it was better to grant a declaration so that the government could de-
cide how best to respond was overly deferential in light of the fact that 
the government did not propose a single alternative remedy to a request 
for repatriation in its submissions other than, of course, a declaration.71  
The government has since decided to respond to the Court’s declara-
tion that it breached Mr. Khadr’s rights by seeking assurances from the 
U.S. government that it will not use the evidence gathered from the Cana-
dian officials’ interviews of Mr. Khadr in their prosecution. Unfortunately, 
as Professor Sujit Choudhry pointed out upon this announcement, the gov-
ernment’s response addresses only one aspect of the ongoing Charter 
violation that the Court identified in Khadr: namely, the potential use of 
the fruits of the interrogation in the prosecution of Mr. Khadr.72 It does not 
address the ongoing detention itself, for which the Court also held the Ca-
nadian government responsible.73 As a result, Mr. Khadr’s lawyers have 
commenced further litigation seeking judicial review of the government’s 
decision.74 How this will all turn out is not clear; but what is clear is that 
Mr. Khadr will continue to suffer the consequences of the Canadian gov-
ernment’s breach of his Charter rights and will have to wait for yet another 
judge to render yet another decision before he can find out whether his 
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rights will be effectively vindicated. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s previous admonitions in Mills, 974649 Ontario Inc. and 
Doucet-Boudreau, Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights are being “smothered in 
procedural delays and difficulties”.75  
The Supreme Court justified its decision to tread carefully in Khadr 
on the ground that it was being asked to step into a realm traditionally 
reserved for the executive branch: foreign relations.76 This reticence 
might be more understandable if it were not for the Court’s previous de-
cision in United States of America v. Burns.77 In Burns, a unanimous 
Court held that section 7 of the Charter prohibits the Canadian govern-
ment from extraditing individuals to face trial in foreign countries 
without receiving assurances that the death penalty will not be sought in 
all but exceptional cases. This was a direct intrusion into the executive’s 
discretion over foreign relations. Nonetheless, the Court rightly held that 
it was justified because all government power — including that of the 
executive — must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. The 
same principle should have been, but was not, applied in Khadr. 
In Khadr, the Court attempted to distinguish Burns by observing 
that, unlike the accused in Burns, Mr. Khadr is not in the control of the 
Canadian government and therefore the likelihood that the proposed 
remedy would succeed is unclear and the impact on Canadian foreign 
relations cannot be properly assessed.78 This is unconvincing.  
First, it is difficult to see how uncertainty as to a particular remedy’s 
likelihood of success can justify the granting of an even less effective 
and more uncertain remedy in its place. If the Court was concerned with 
efficacy, surely the granting of a mere declaration was not the answer. 
And in any event, the government’s claim that a request for repatriation 
would not have been effective was belied by the fact that the U.S. had 
complied with requests from all other Western countries for the return of 
their nationals from Guantánamo Bay.79  
Second, with respect to the impact on Canada’s relations with the 
U.S., it is notable that the Canadian government did not adduce any evi-
dence as to the harm that would be caused to such relations by a request 
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for repatriation.80 The Court correctly noted the “inadequacy of the re-
cord” regarding the “range of considerations currently faced by the 
government in assessing Mr. Khadr’s request”, but incorrectly used this 
as a reason to deny Mr. Khadr the remedy he sought.81 In doing so, the 
Court placed the onus on the wrong party. Mr. Khadr cannot be faulted 
for failing to put before the Court evidence of Canada’s diplomatic con-
cerns; such information lies within the exclusive knowledge and 
possession of the Canadian government; therefore, the absence of evi-
dence should have given rise to an inference that the risk of harm was 
insignificant. 
Indeed, the fact that Mr. Khadr was not in the control of the Cana-
dian government suggests that foreign relations ought to have been less 
of a concern, and not more. A request for an assurance that the death 
penalty will not be sought in the extradition context is a much stronger 
imposition of Canada’s values on the U.S. than would be a request for 
repatriation, since the former is made in light of the government’s ability 
to frustrate the foreign prosecution by refusing to turn over the person in 
its control. By contrast, the remedy that Mr. Khadr sought was a modest 
one that would not have required the Canadian government to wield its 
power in such a muscular way. Therefore, if a request for an assurance 
that the death penalty will not be imposed was held to be necessary in 
Burns, a fortiori a request for repatriation should have been held to be 
necessary in Khadr. However, as it did in Bjelland, the Court retreated 
from the boldness of its earlier section 24(1) jurisprudence. 
V. R. V. NASOGALUAK — SENTENCE REDUCTION AND  
MANDATORY MINIMUMS 
The shift in focus from promoting remedial efficacy to minimizing 
government burdens continued in Nasogaluak. This is perhaps the least 
discouraging of the three cases reviewed in this paper, although it none-
theless fits comfortably within the Court’s recent trend of deferring to 
governmental interests not only at the section 1 justification stage, but 
also at the section 24(1) remedial stage.  
In the early morning of May 12, 2004, the RCMP received a tip 
about an intoxicated driver. A high-speed chase ensued and Mr. Na-
sogaluak’s vehicle eventually came to an abrupt stop. Mr. Nasogaluak 
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opened the car door and swung his feet out of the vehicle, which 
prompted one of the officers to point his revolver and flashlight at Mr. 
Nasogaluak and order him to get out of the vehicle with his hands up. 
Mr. Nasogaluak did not comply and put his feet back inside the vehicle. 
One of the officers grabbed Mr. Nasogaluak as he was clutching onto the 
steering wheel and doorframe and punched him in the head. Mr. Na-
sogaluak let go of the steering wheel and reached out to the officer, who 
then punched Mr. Nasogaluak in the head a second time, pulled him out 
of the car and wrestled him onto the ground.82  
While on the ground, one of the officers gave Mr. Nasogaluak a third 
hard punch to the head. By this time, Mr. Nasogaluak was pinned face 
down on the pavement with the officer straddling his back. When Mr. 
Nasogaluak refused to offer his hands to be handcuffed, another officer 
punched him in the back twice. These blows were hard enough to break 
Mr. Nasogaluak’s ribs, which later punctured one of his lungs.83  
Mr. Nasogaluak pleaded guilty to impaired driving and flight from 
the police. At his sentencing hearing, he requested a stay of proceedings 
on the grounds that the police used excessive force upon his arrest, failed 
to properly report his injuries and failed to obtain medical assistance for 
him in breach of his rights under sections 7, 11(d) and 12 of the Charter. 
In the alternative, Mr. Nasogaluak sought a reduced sentence as a Charter 
remedy.84 
The trial judge found the officers in breach of sections 7 and 11(d) of 
the Charter. Most importantly, the trial judge found that the third punch 
to Mr. Nasogaluak’s head and the subsequent punches to Mr. Na-
sogaluak’s back were unwarranted and therefore excessive. The trial 
judge refused to grant a stay of proceedings but instead granted Mr. Na-
sogaluak a sentence reduction under section 24(1) of the Charter. The 
trial judge noted that offences such as impaired driving and flight from 
the police would normally be punished by incarceration of 6 to 18 
months. However, the trial judge said that he was satisfied that the need 
for deterrence was met by Mr. Nasogaluak’s “life-altering experience” 
and that the Charter breaches were “so egregious as to justify taking Mr. 
Nasogaluak from the realm of cases that require incarceration”. Accord-
ingly, the trial judge granted Mr. Nasogaluak a conditional discharge on 
both counts.85 With respect to the count of impaired driving, this sentence 
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fell below the mandatory minimum of a $600 fine for first offences under 
section 255(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.86  
A majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s 
decision to grant a sentence reduction to remedy the Charter breaches 
under section 24(1), but held that the trial judge could not go below the 
mandatory minimum provided by statute. Therefore, the majority set 
aside the trial judge’s order for a conditional discharge in respect of the 
offence of impaired driving and imposed the mandatory minimum fine of 
$600. The majority did not interfere with the conditional discharge 
granted for the offence of flight from the police. Justice Côté dissented 
and held that the trial judge applied the wrong test for determining 
whether a sentence reduction should be granted and that his reasons for 
the sentence were inadequate.87  
The question of whether a sentence reduction is an available remedy 
under section 24(1) and, if so, under what circumstances, came up before 
the Supreme Court of Canada. A number of conflicting authorities ex-
isted at the provincial appellate court level. In R. v. Carpenter,88 the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal suggested that sentence reductions 
should never be granted as a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter 
because this would inappropriately shift the focus of the sentencing  
process from the accused to the state, which in turn would send mixed 
messages to the community and further lengthen and complicate  
proceedings. In R. v. Glykis,89 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that sen-
tence reductions should be available, but only where the Charter breach 
either (a) mitigated the seriousness of the offence; or (b) imposed pun-
ishment or undue hardship on the offenders. In the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s view, this precluded sentence reduction as a remedy for a 
breach of the right to counsel. Meanwhile, other courts such as the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal and Saskatchewan Court of Appeal did not 
feel the need to impose any constraints on the trial judge’s discretion to 
grant sentence reductions under section 24(1). In R. v. Dennison,90 the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal granted a sentence reduction to remedy 
the breach of the accused’s section 7 right to speak at his sentencing 
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hearing. In R. v. Stannard,91 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal granted a 
sentence reduction to remedy the violations of the accused’s right to 
counsel and right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure.  
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada did not choose between 
these varying approaches and instead charted its own course. In a unani-
mous judgment written by LeBel J., the Court held that the “intense 
debate” that had taken place among the provincial appellate courts  
regarding the availability of sentence reduction as a Charter remedy “re-
flects a misapprehension of the flexibility and contextual nature of the 
sentencing process in Canada”.92 In the Court’s view, the sentencing pro-
visions in the Criminal Code on their own, without the need to resort to 
the Charter, can generally provide remedial protection to individuals 
whose rights have been infringed by state misconduct.93 
The Court’s decision is encouraging in that it unequivocally rejects 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s comments in Carpenter (which 
were relied on by various provincial attorneys general in their submis-
sions before the Court) that state misconduct has no place in a sentencing 
hearing. In doing so, the Court rightly observed that state misconduct 
was considered to be a mitigating factor in sentencing long before the 
Charter was enacted; it would be absurd to say that it should stop being 
so considered simply because it now constitutes a constitutional viola-
tion.94 Therefore, even when the state misconduct does not rise to the 
level of a Charter breach, the Court held that it can be considered a miti-
gating factor in sentencing.95  
The Court astutely observed that this is consistent with the commu-
nicative function of sentencing. Section 718 of the Criminal Code 
describes the fundamental purpose of sentencing as that of contributing 
to “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe 
society”. This function must be understood, the Court held, in relation 
not only to the actions of the offender, but also to those of state actors. 
Everyone is subject to the law and the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the land. As the Court stated, a “sentence cannot be ‘fit’ if it does not re-
spect the fundamental values enshrined in the Charter”.96 
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The Court also appears to have rejected the restrictive criteria im-
posed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Glykis: namely, that the state 
misconduct must have either mitigated the seriousness of the offence or 
imposed hardship or punishment on the offender. The former criterion 
was extracted from the old entrapment cases where the police were im-
plicated in either creating or encouraging the commission of offences97 
and, therefore, has been of little relevance to sentencing ever since the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that entrapment warrants a stay of pro-
ceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter in R. v. Mack.98 The latter 
criterion — that the Charter breach must impose hardship or punishment 
— was intended by the Ontario Court of Appeal to limit the Charter 
breaches that can be considered on sentencing to those of arbitrary deten-
tion or delay, although it is not clear why a denial of any constitutional 
right would not impose “hardship” or “punishment”. The Supreme Court 
rightly rejected an approach that would draw arbitrary distinctions be-
tween different Charter rights for the purposes of sentencing. 
In place of the Glykis criteria, the Supreme Court imposed a re-
quirement that the impugned state conduct must relate to the individual 
offender and the circumstances of the offence in order to be considered 
on sentencing.99 The former seems obvious. If the offender is raising 
state misconduct as a mitigating factor on sentencing, the impugned con-
duct would almost certainly relate to him or her and it is difficult to see 
how the offender would have standing to raise it otherwise. The latter, 
however, is trickier. On its face, the phrase “circumstances of the of-
fence” would appear to limit the types of state misconduct that can be 
considered on sentencing to actions related to the commission of the of-
fence (e.g., in the case of entrapment, where the police are involved in 
the actual commission of the offence and not simply its investigation). 
This would impose a significant restraint on the ability of sentencing 
judges to consider state misconduct and would essentially represent an 
endorsement of the restrictive Glykis approach.  
This does not, however, appear to have been the Court’s intention. 
Throughout the Court’s decision, the Court gave examples of Charter 
breaches and lesser forms of state misconduct that have been legitimately 
considered in sentencing which do not relate to the commission of the 
offence: assault by prison guards, excessive force in arrest, delay, and 
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unreasonable search and seizure.100 This suggests that what the Court 
meant by “circumstances of the offence” was anything related to the 
commission, investigation or prosecution of the offence. Viewed in this 
way, this constraint is not really much of a constraint at all. The Court’s 
affirmation of the breadth of a trial judge’s sentencing discretion in this 
regard is a welcome development. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision does not end there. In-
stead, it goes on to impose two additional constraints on the ability of 
trial judges to take Charter breaches and lesser forms of state misconduct 
into account on sentencing: first, any sentences that a trial judge imposes 
must, even after consideration of the state misconduct, respect the princi-
ple of proportionality expressed in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code;101 
second, trial judges cannot impose sentences that fall below the manda-
tory minimums provided for in the Criminal Code.102 Both of these 
constraints are a direct consequence of the Court’s decision to situate the 
inquiry within the statutory framework for sentencing in the Criminal 
Code rather than the constitutional framework for remedies under section 
24(1). A compelling argument can be made that both these constraints 
operate to unjustifiably fetter the discretion of trial judges and impede 
their ability to offer meaningful and effective remedies for constitutional 
violations.  
Dealing first with the constraint of proportionality, section 718.1 of 
the Criminal Code provides that a “sentence must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” 
(emphasis added). Where the goal is simply to provide an offender with 
the most appropriate and just sentence for his or her offence, this is un-
doubtedly a commendable principle. Where the goal is not only to 
sentence the offender but also to remedy a breach of Charter rights, how-
ever, it is questionable whether this constraint should still be imposed. 
State misconduct generally does not touch on either the gravity of the 
offence or the degree of responsibility of the offender. If a police officer 
unlawfully searches an individual’s home without a warrant and finds 10 
kilograms of cocaine, for example, that individual is not less responsible 
for the possession of contraband for the purpose of trafficking, nor is the 
offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking any less serious due 
to the breach of the individual’s section 8 right to be secure from  
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unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, if the individual’s penalty 
must ultimately be proportionate to responsibility and gravity, there is 
not much room for the consideration of government wrongdoing to  
reduce the sentence. Since an individual’s sentence must be proportionate 
to his or her level of responsibility and the gravity of his or her offence 
even absent a Charter breach, the danger is that the individual will not be 
receiving much of a remedy at all so long as his or her penalty must  
remain proportionate to responsibility and gravity. The imposing pres-
ence of these two polestars risks rendering the remedy of sentence 
reduction impotent. 
It would, therefore, have been preferable for the Supreme Court to 
have adopted a two-stage analysis: first, what is the most appropriate and 
just sentence for the offender having regard to the gravity of the offence 
and the degree of responsibility of the offender; second, to what extent 
should this sentence be reduced to remedy the breaches of the offender’s 
Charter rights under section 24(1) of the Charter. Under this framework, 
the question of remedy under section 24(1) would be separated from the 
question of proportionality in the sentencing process the same way that 
the question of remedy under section 24(2) is separated from the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence in the trial process, with the effect being that 
the integrity of both inquiries is preserved. Indeed, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal appeared to endorse such an approach in its reasons in Na-
sogaluak: 
Having regard to the principles set out in Roberts and Prymak, we 
agree with the Crown submission that the sentence imposed for the 
offence of evading the police is unfit having regard the seriousness of 
the offence. We reaffirm the principles set out in those cases. However, 
that does not assist the Crown on this appeal, as the issue we must 
decide is not whether the sentence is fit, but whether the sentencing 
judge erred in granting the conditional discharge on the basis that the 
reduction in sentence was the just and appropriate remedy for the 
Charter breaches. The sentencing judge acknowledged that absent the 
Charter remedy issue, a lengthy term of imprisonment would have 
been required. He committed no error in law or principle in doing so, 
and this Court cannot interfere.103 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada did not follow this ap-
proach. The consequences of the analytical framework adopted by the 
Supreme Court will not become clearer until the courts begin to interpret 
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and apply Nasogaluak. If it turns out that individuals accused are not re-
ceiving much of a remedy at all for the breaches of their Charter rights 
on sentencing because the courts find their hands tied by section 718.1, 
the solution may be for counsel to pursue a formal section 24(1) Charter 
application. While the Supreme Court indicated a strong preference for 
the sentencing framework of sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code, 
the Court did not rule out resort to section 24(1) of the Charter for the 
remedy of sentence reduction. It simply said that, in most cases, section 
24(1) is unnecessary and will not make a difference. Where counsel think 
it will make a difference, they should not hesitate to rely on section 24(1) 
directly and should cite the following passage from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in doing so:  
Like other legal processes, the sentencing system remains subject to the 
scrutiny of the Charter and its overarching values and principles. 
Although, as we have seen above, the proper interpretation and 
application of the sentencing process will allow courts to effectively 
address most of the situations where Charter breaches are alleged, there 
may be exceptions to this general rule.104 
Resort to section 24(1) of the Charter will also be necessary where 
the mandatory minimums in the Criminal Code prevent accused indi-
viduals from receiving effective and meaningful remedies for the 
breaches of their Charter rights. In Nasogaluak, the Court allowed for the 
possibility that accused individuals could apply under section 24(1) of 
the Charter in an attempt to reduce sentences below the mandatory 
minimums in the Criminal Code but held that this could only be done in 
“exceptional circumstances”.105 The Court did not, however, define “ex-
ceptional circumstances” (except to say that it was not this case) nor did 
it explain why a judge exercising his or her constitutional discretion 
could only reduce a sentence below a statutory minimum in exceptional 
circumstances. 
The Court’s refusal to address the more complex questions underly-
ing this issue is disappointing. For instance, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
had held that reduction of a sentence below the mandatory minimums in 
the Criminal Code was not permitted due to its previous holding in R. v. 
Ferguson (subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada),106 
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which said that constitutional exemptions cannot be granted for manda-
tory minimum sentences under section 24(1).107 There are good 
arguments to be made that the Alberta Court of Appeal erred in applying 
Ferguson in this manner because both the Court of Appeal’s and the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s decisions in that case were distinguishable from 
Nasogaluak.108 The Supreme Court presumably agreed with this view 
because it could not have concluded that a sentence can be reduced be-
low a mandatory minimum if it thought otherwise. Unfortunately, the 
Court did not explain this conclusion or provide any analysis of Fergu-
son and its applicability to this case.  
Once it is concluded that section 24(1) of the Charter permits sen-
tences to be reduced below the mandatory minimums in the Criminal 
Code, it is difficult to understand why this should only be done in “ex-
ceptional circumstances”. The question is whether a statutory provision 
can operate to constrain the constitutional discretion granted by section 
24(1) of the Charter, which the Court had previously described as the 
“widest possible discretion”.109 This question had already been answered 
in Doucet-Boudreau: 
The power of the superior courts under section 24(1) to make 
appropriate and just orders to remedy infringements or denials of 
Charter rights is part of the supreme law of Canada. It follows that this 
remedial power cannot be strictly limited by statutes or rules of the 
common law.110 
And yet, in holding that section 24(1) only permits a sentence to be 
reduced below a legislated minimum in “exceptional circumstances”, the 
Court concluded that the remedial power of section 24(1) can be limited 
by statute. Strangely, the Court did not refer to Doucet-Boudreau at all in 
Nasogaluak.  
The Court’s decision in Nasogaluak is also arguably inconsistent 
with its previous decision in R. v. Wust.111 In Wust, the question was 
whether section 719(3) of the Criminal Code grants trial judges the dis-
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cretion to reduce a sentence below a mandatory minimum after taking 
into account any time spent in pre-sentencing custody. Section 719(3), as 
it was worded at the time, did not expressly confer any such discretion: 
 719(3) In determining the sentence to be imposed on a person 
convicted of an offence, a court may take into account any time spent 
in custody by the person as a result of the offence.112 
Nonetheless, the Court held that trial judges can reduce a sentence 
below the mandatory minimum after considering any time spent in pre-
sentencing custody because to hold otherwise would be “offensive both 
to rationality and to justice”.113 The Court adopted the reasoning of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. McDonald,114 in which Rosenberg J.A. 
cited several reasons for interpreting section 719(3) to permit the reduc-
tion of sentences below a statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum, 
including: (i) section 719(3) is not a mere codification of a principle of 
sentencing, but is a provision that gives a court the substantive power to 
relieve against what might otherwise be considered a harsh or unfair re-
sult;115 (ii) it would be unjust and unfair for a statutorily prescribed 
minimum sentence to set outer limits on a judge’s ability to give credit for 
time served in pre-sentencing custody;116 (iii) it is important for judges to 
be able to remedy the burden of pre-sentencing custody given that this 
burden falls more heavily on those choosing to exercise their constitutional 
right to assert their innocence and require the Crown to prove its case be-
yond a reasonable doubt at trial.117 Each of these reasons applies with even 
greater force where a Charter breach has been established and the purpose 
of the sentence reduction is to remedy such a breach.  
Thus, it is difficult to square the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision 
in McDonald and the Supreme Court of Canada’s endorsement of that 
decision in Wust with the Supreme Court’s decision in Nasogaluak. Just 
as the Court in Khadr allowed the executive branch to fetter the constitu-
tional discretion of trial judges under section 24(1) despite a precedent to 
the contrary (i.e., Burns), the Court in Nasogaluak allowed the legislative 
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branch to do the same despite the precedent of Wust. The courts are now 
left in the peculiar position of having the statutory discretion to reduce a 
sentence below the mandatory minimum under section 719(3) of the 
Criminal Code, but not having the constitutional discretion to do the 
same under section 24(1) of the Charter except in “exceptional circum-
stances”, which is as yet undefined.118  
This sort of incongruity in the law can produce absurd results, which 
is perhaps best illustrated by the Ontario Court of Justice’s decision in R. 
v. Padda.119 In that case, the trial judge found the accused guilty of im-
paired driving and refusing to provide breath samples. He also found that 
the accused had his section 8 Charter right violated when he was strip 
searched by the police. In determining whether the accused’s sentence 
could be reduced as a Charter remedy under section 24(1), the trial judge 
felt that binding case law prohibited him from granting a sentence below 
the minimum prescribed by the Criminal Code, although he came to this 
conclusion reluctantly and only after urging a re-examination of the case 
law.120  
The trial judge struggled with the option of simply granting the de-
fendant the minimum sentence because “(e)ven without any Charter 
violation, the defendant would probably be a candidate for the minimum 
fines” as this was “a case of a first offence without serious aggravating 
features”.121 Therefore, it would not have been much of a remedy to sim-
ply sentence the defendant to the minimum fine. The trial judge’s 
solution to this problem was to force himself into a completely technical 
and artificial analysis. The trial judge cited the fact that the defendant had 
spent 10 hours in pre-sentencing custody and relied on this fact to reduce 
the defendant’s sentence below the mandatory minimum, because section 
719(3) of the Criminal Code could go where section 24(1) of the Charter 
apparently could not. The trial judge sentenced the accused to a fine of 
one dollar on each count.122 
The absurdity of the trial judge’s reasoning is, of course, no fault of 
his own. He was simply trying to reach a fair and just result while work-
ing within the irrational constraints of binding case law. Those 
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constraints have since been relaxed slightly by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Nasogaluak, because the Court has at least recognized the 
possibility of reducing a sentence below a mandatory minimum to rem-
edy a Charter breach under section 24(1). Nevertheless, the Court has not 
explained, and it is not apparent, why such reductions ought to be limited 
to an undefined set of “exceptional circumstances” given the Court’s 
previous statement in Doucet-Boudreau that remedial power under sec-
tion 24(1) cannot be limited by statute. Such a conclusion is consistent 
only with the Court’s recent decisions in Bjelland and Khadr, in which 
the Court has shifted the focus away from remedial efficacy and toward 
greater deference to government. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Section 24(1) of the Charter, perhaps more than any other provision 
in Canadian law, warrants a large and liberal interpretation. It is a reme-
dial provision, it is in the Constitution, and it is textually broad in scope. 
Moreover, it has been the beneficiary of extremely generous language 
from the Supreme Court of Canada and has, up until this past year, been 
generally applied in a manner consistent with this rhetoric. The Court’s 
decisions in Bjelland, Khadr and Nasogaluak represent a departure from 
this jurisprudence.  
Just prior to the publication of this paper, the Court decided another 
section 24(1) case: Ward v. Vancouver (City).123 In that case, the central 
issue that split the British Columbia Court of Appeal was whether a 
plaintiff must be required to establish that the government acted in bad 
faith before being entitled to the remedy of damages under section 24(1) 
of the Charter. In that regard, the Court’s unanimous decision is promis-
ing from a rights-protection perspective: in a thorough discussion of the 
availability of damages as a section 24(1) remedy, the Court did not once 
mention “bad faith” as a prerequisite.  
As with Nasogaluak, however, the Court’s reasons in Ward become 
more discouraging once the surface is peeled back. While a detailed dis-
cussion about the merits of the judgment is beyond the scope of this 
paper, one aspect of the case stands out as an unfortunate punctuation 
mark to the trend established by Bjelland, Khadr and Nasogaluak — 
namely, the quantum of damages awarded. The trial judge found that the 
police violated the plaintiff’s section 8 Charter right when they mistak-
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enly identified him as the individual who attempted to throw a pie at then 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and, as a result, strip searched him at the 
police station. The Supreme Court described the plaintiff’s injury as “se-
rious” and the violation as “egregious”, and rightly noted that strip 
searches are “inherently humiliating and degrading”.124 Nonetheless, the 
Court held that the paltry sum of $5,000 was sufficient not only to com-
pensate the plaintiff, but also to achieve the remedial objectives of 
vindication and deterrence.125 
It is difficult to see how any potential plaintiff would decide that an 
action for a breach of Charter rights is worth pursuing when even a vic-
tory would likely not offset the cost of legal fees.126 Moreover, to the 
extent that such actions are pursued, it is difficult to imagine the govern-
ment viewing a potential damages award as anything more than a licence 
fee to pursue state interests aggressively at the expense of individual 
Charter rights, should it already be so inclined. 
Indeed, the least intrusive remedy will rarely be the most effective. 
Up until Bjelland, Khadr and Nasogaluak (and now perhaps Ward), the 
Court has laudably leaned toward the latter and not the former. That is no 
longer true. The Court has scaled back the scope of section 24(1) of the 
Charter in both its rhetoric and its application. Given the inextricable link 
between rights and remedies and the paramount importance of the Char-
ter in our constitutional democracy, one can only hope that, in the long 
run, this set of cases will represent an anomalous outlier and not a turn-
ing point. 
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